e Abstract-We sought to describe the implementation of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) at National Cheng Kung University Hospital (NCKUH) in Taiwan, ROC during the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in early 2003. We administered a 14-question survey via structured interviews to individuals occupying activated HEICS leadership positions at NCKUH to identify the organization, structure, and function of the HEICS units and subunits they led and the job actions they performed from 25 March to 16 June 2003 Thirty-three of 38 persons (87%) occupying 39 of 44 (89%) activated HEICS leadership positions directly participated in the survey. The participants collectively reported: 1) the creation of four new HEICS unit leader positions and corresponding units during the outbreak, including the infection control officer (administrative section) and SARS assessment, isolation, and critical care unit leaders (operations section); 2) the creation of six new HEICS subunits, including functional areas for fever screening, SARS assessment, and resuscitation outside the hospital, and SARS patient care, SARS critical care, and employee isolation inside the hospital; and 3) the performance of new job actions related to infection control by all HEICS unit leaders. HEICS provides a flexible framework that seems to have assisted NCKUH in the organization of its emergency response to the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, ROC. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. e Keywords-emergency management; hospital emergency incident command system; infection control; severe acute respiratory syndrome; Taiwan
INTRODUCTION
, an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was recognized in Taiwan, Republic of China, an island nation located 130 kilometers east of mainland China, when the first two probable cases of SARS were diagnosed in a recent traveler to Guangdong Province and his wife (1, 2) . By 22 April, Taiwan experienced only 29 probable SARS cases, four of which resulted from secondary transmission from the index case (one physician and three family contacts) (1, 3, 4) . However, by 22 May, the nosocomial spread of SARS in at least nine hospitals catapulted the number of probable cases to 583, including 60 deaths (1, 5) . When the last probable case of SARS was reported on 15 June, 671 probable cases of SARS had occurred, with 83 deaths, seven of which were in health-care workers (4, 6, 7) .
Although various aspects of the operational response and clinical management of SARS have been reported from hospitals in several countries, little has been reported about overall hospital emergency management during a SARS outbreak (8 -21) . Furthermore, despite the growing popularity of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) as an organizational tool for hospital emergency management in the United States and elsewhere, little has been reported about the application of HEICS to actual hospital emergencies of any type (22) (23) (24) . Accordingly, we sought to characterize the implementation of HEICS at a tertiary level hospital during the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, ROC.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Study Design
We performed a cross-sectional survey of individuals occupying activated HEICS leadership positions at National Cheng Kung University (NCKUH) during the SARS outbreak. This study was approved by the IRB at NCKUH on 3 May 2003.
Study Setting
The study setting was NCKUH, one of 15 tertiary care medical centers in Taiwan, ROC (population 23 million). Located in the southwestern city of Tainan, NCKUH serves a population of 1.7 million and has a catchment area of approximately 2200 km 2. NCKUH has 1173 beds, 83 ICU beds, and 60 emergency department (ED) beds; offers the full complement of medical specialties, including emergency medicine, infectious disease, pulmonary medicine, and hospital epidemiology; and has an affiliated medical school. The annual ED census is 62,602 with 13,545 admissions per year. After the JiJi earthquake in 1999, the hospital adopted the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) as its organizational system for hospital emergency management.
Study Period
We defined the study period as the duration of the SARS outbreak at NCKUH, beginning on 25 March and ending on 16 June 2003. We designated 25 March as the first day of our study, because on the evening of 24 March, NCKUH activated its hospital emergency plan and HE-ICS in response to the growing SARS outbreak. On 26 March, NCKUH received its first suspected case of SARS. We selected 16 June as the last day of the study, because the following day the World Health Organization (WHO) removed its travel advisory for Taiwan (25) .
Definitions
We used the definitions of suspected and probable SARS recommended by WHO and implemented in Taiwan on 17 March (26) . Diarrhea was also used as a criterion for suspected SARS in Taiwan, because diarrhea had been reported as a prominent early symptom in Hong Kong and Taipei (1, 16) . No attempt was made to classify probable patient-cases of SARS in Taiwan into a "confirmed" patient-case category, because no international consensus existed for the case definition of "confirmed SARS" during the study period. These definitions remained unchanged throughout the study period except for the identity of areas with local transmission of SARS, which changed throughout the study. We also used the term "possible SARS" to describe those patients undergoing evaluation for suspected or probable SARS.
We used standard HEICS nomenclature to define HEICS leadership positions (23) . We defined a HEICS "subunit" as a separate functional area under the command and control of a single HEICS unit leader.
Selection of Participants
We selected persons occupying activated HEICS leadership positions during the SARS outbreak as potential survey participants. These persons were identified by the Emergency Operations Committee (EOC) at NCKUH as occupying HEICS leadership positions that were either activated from the baseline HEICS plan at NCKUH or newly created during the SARS outbreak (the EOC was comprised of all HEICS administrative positions and section chiefs). We excluded persons occupying leadership positions in the baseline HEICS plan that were not activated during the outbreak. The baseline HEICS plan at NCKUH has three fewer positions than the standard 49-position version used in the United States (i.e., a medical staff director, ancillary services director, and cardiopulmonary unit leader are absent) (23, 24) .
Methods of Measurement
We administered a survey to the participants, consisting of 14 open-ended questions ( Table 1) . These questions were aimed at identifying the participant's pre-existing job title at NCKUH, confirming the participant's occupation of a HEICS leadership position during the SARS outbreak, and characterizing the organization, structure, and function of the HEICS units and subunits the participant led and the job actions performed during the SARS outbreak. We based our survey on published recommendations for evaluating hospital disaster response and on previous studies that used structured interview methodology to characterize disaster response (27) (28) (29) (30) .
Data Collection and Processing
Four trained research assistants under the supervision of the first author surveyed the study participants via structured interviews from 20 to 27 May. Participants were provided our written survey tool and the research assistant recorded their verbal responses. The first author supplemented these primary surveys with periodic secondary surveys of the HEICS administrative and section leaders at the conclusion of daily EOC meetings during the remainder of the outbreak. The first author also attempted to clarify ambiguous or contradictory responses through secondary surveys and structured interviews. Any information remaining ambiguous or contradictory was adjudicated by the consensus agreement of the authors. All participants provided their informed consent to participate in the interviews. When persons occupying activated HEICS leadership positions declined or were unable to participate in the survey, then relevant data were collected from their designated proxies or from their superiors in the activated HEICS organization. Data were en-tered into spreadsheets using Windows XP Excel software (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA).
Primary Data Analysis
We combined the survey responses across all participants to produce an organizational chart showing the actual activation of HEICS at NCKUH during the SARS outbreak. We confirmed the identities of HEICS units and subunits that were reported as being newly created and identified HEICS units that did not open by comparison with the HEICS organizational chart in existence at NCKUH before the outbreak. We combined the participants' descriptions of the structures and functions of HEICS units and subunits that were newly created or substantially modified (i.e., given a new major function)-the infection control office, fever screening subunit, triage unit, SARS assessment unit, SARS isolation unit, and SARS critical care unit.
We combined the survey responses to correlate each activated HEICS leadership position, the pre-existing job title of each individual executing that position, and new Implementation of HEICS in SARS Outbreak, Taiwan SARS-related job actions (not specified in the baseline hospital emergency plan) performed by that leader during the outbreak.
Data Presentation
We present our data describing the HEICS organizational structure at NCKUH during the SARS outbreak as a chart ( Figure 1 ) for convenient comparison with the standard HEICS organizational chart. We tabulated other descriptive information according to HEICS unit or subunit.
RESULTS
Thirty-three of 38 persons (87%) occupying 39 of 44 (89%) leadership positions in the activated version of HEICS at NCKUH directly participated in the survey, including the four persons occupying the four leadership positions newly created during the outbreak (Tables 2-5). One individual was represented in the survey by a proxy that he appointed, whereas four others, who declined or were unable to participate, were represented by their superiors in the HEICS structure (Tables 2, 3, and 5). Figure 1 shows the actual activation of HEICS during the SARS outbreak at NCKUH. Four HEICS positions (and corresponding units) and six subunits were created during the SARS outbreak. Six HEICS units not activated during the SARS outbreak included the damage assessment and control, time, delayed treatment, minor treatment, discharge, and dependent care units.
The structure and function of newly created HEICS units and subunits (and the modified Triage unit) are summarized in Table 6 . Table 2 shows each activated leadership position in the HEICS administrative section at NCKUH, the job title of each position holder, and new job actions during the event that were not anticipated in the baseline hospital emergency plan. Tables 3-5 show similar information for the HEICS operations, logistics, planning, and finance sections.
DISCUSSION
The implementation of HEICS at NCKUH during this SARS outbreak illustrates several features of HEICS that seem to have assisted the organization of hospital emergency response at NCKUH (23, 24) . First, HEICS provided a flexible organizational structure that facilitated the creation of new units and subunits and new functions of hospital emergency response as the evolving crisis demanded. This organizational flexibility was imperative because a rapidly evolving infectious disease emergency involving a highly contagious agent had never been encountered before. A major critical adaptation at NCKUH was the establishment of the infection control officer within the HEICS administrative section. Because infection control plays a key role in contagious infectious disease emergencies, it is paramount that the infection control officer has an overall perspective of the entire hospital, a close advisory relationship with the incident commander, and direct communication links with other HEICS managers and section chiefs. The importance of infection control in the emergency response to SARS cannot be overstated, and off-limits areas with yellow tape barriers Enforced restriction of vendor deliveries to 5:00 a.m. at hospital basement entrance * Regional SARS Emergency Network was comprised of the Tainan city health bureau and five hospitals in the city. ** Appointed deputy safety and security officer to participate in survey. 
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because no prophylactic or therapeutic interventions were known to be effective against SARS at the time. Another critical adaptation was the establishment of a new SARS assessment unit leader and corresponding unit in temporary shelters outside the ED. This unit not only provided several new SARS-related functions in its three subunits, but its outdoor configuration enabled the expansion of ED isolation surge capacity without having to modify the existing ED structure or reduce patient care capacity in the already overcrowded ED. Another key adaptation was the creation of a new fever-screening subunit to screen for fever all persons entering the outpatient entrance of the hospital and the expansion of the triage unit's function to screen for fever all persons entering the ED entrance of the hospital. Because these services were based in temporary areas out-side the hospital, no changes were required in the hospital structure. Paralleling these efforts outside the hospital were the creation of the SARS isolation and critical care units inside the hospital for the management of patients with suspected and probable SARS and the isolation of febrile employees. The creation of these units within functionally overlapping areas enabled the production of in-hospital isolation surge capacity without a major disruption of patient care services. Second, HEICS provided a predictable modular framework that helped NCKUH to logically determine where these new units and subunits were to be placed within the overall organization, enabling their rapid assimilation into the greater whole.
Third, the organizational flexibility of HEICS enabled Supervised erection of DRASH © units in fever screening subunit and SARS assessment unit, and large umbrella in triage unit Supervised installation of power and lighting in outdoor units, O 2 supply in SARS assessment unit and resuscitation area, and portable suction in SARS resuscitation area Supervised deployment of furnishings to fever screening subunit, triage unit and SARS assessment unit Supervised remodeling in SARS isolation unit, including installation of internal physical barriers (e.g., plastic curtain at nurse's station in SARS isolation unit) Supervised conversion of elevators to use with special access cards only Although these inactivated units may have been helpful during an earthquake or typhoon, they were unnecessary during the SARS outbreak, which did not cause structural damage to the hospital, generate large numbers of victims, produce victims with minor injuries, produce injuries that could be managed in a delayed manner, or displace dependents of hospital personnel. Fourth, HEICS provided a hierarchical command and control structure that helped infection control policy at NCKUH rapidly evolve as the situation unfolded. Almost daily during the outbreak, the Taiwanese Center for Disease Control recommended new infection control policy to the infection control officer at NCKUH (2) . In other cases, the infection control officer communicated directly with hospitals in Taipei, Hong Kong, and Singapore or accessed the Internet to learn from other's experience with SARS (19) . The infection control officer then used this information to make frequent policy recommendations for infection control at NCKUH to the EOC. The EOC considered these recommendations at their daily meetings and the incident commander made any final policy decisions. New or updated infection control policy was then promptly disseminated to relevant HEICS sections and units through the hospital intranet.
Fifth, HEICS provided a flexible mechanism that enabled NCKUH to customize the assignment of individuals to leadership positions based on the requirements of the event and the availability of personnel. For example, the chairman of the infection control committee not only assumed the role of infection control officer, but also that of operations chief, because the deputy superintendent, who would normally occupy this position, was absent from NCKUH during the entire outbreak (altogether, five individuals occupied more than one HEICS position each).
Sixth, HEICS provided a logical framework that assisted NCKUH in assigning and organizing job actions not anticipated in the baseline hospital emergency plan. During the SARS outbreak at NCKUH, every HEICS position was reported as having new job actions related to infection control (Tables 2-5) . At a minimum, every HEICS unit leader had the responsibility to educate the unit members about infection control measures, ensure the use of adequate personal protective equipment (PPE), and monitor the unit personnel for fever (body temperature was checked twice per 8-h shift). Overall, many new job actions related to infection control were required, including activities related to patient isolation, traffic and perimeter control, decontamination, handwashing, and fever screening. Finally, HEICS provided a convenient mechanism for capturing key hospital emergency response activities ac- cording to the job actions of each HEICS position. Knowledge of job actions at NCKUH during the SARS outbreak may assist other hospitals seeking to use HEICS (Tables 2-5 ). In addition, this SARS outbreak demonstrated many of the features suggestive of a bioterrorist attack, including the aerosol spread of infection, predominate pulmonary pattern of disease, multiple patients with similar signs and symptoms, simultaneous presentation, multiple simultaneous outbreaks, and lack of an identified natural vector. Accordingly, an understanding of the implementation of HEICS at NCKUH may help emergency preparedness not only for future outbreaks of SARS, but also for intentional releases of contagious biological agents in susceptible populations (e.g., smallpox, pneumonic plague). This study is also subject to several limitations. Our selection of potential survey participants as occupants of HEICS leadership positions may have led to omissions of information about critical actions performed by nonmanagement personnel. Our structured interview methodology may have encouraged some participants to selfreport more favorable versions of actions than were actually performed (recall bias). Our analysis of the descriptive data may be biased, because three of the authors also participated in the NCKUH emergency response. Our inability to directly survey five persons occupying HEICS leadership positions may have led to an incomplete description of the structure and function of HEICS during the outbreak. Moreover, we did not evaluate the perceived adequacy or success of HEICS by the participants at NCKUH. Finally, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of HEICS at NCKUH during the outbreak or compare HEICS with other systems of hospital emergency management. On one hand, only 38 patients were hospitalized with suspected or probable SARS during the outbreak at NCKUH, three of whom died, suggesting a low burden of disease. On the other hand, no cases of nosocomial transmission occurred at NCKUH, suggesting that the disease was successfully contained.
In conclusion, HEICS provides a flexible, predictable framework that seems to have facilitated the organization of hospital emergency response at NCKUH during the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, including the creation of new units and subunits of emergency response, the development of new infection control policies in response to the rapidly changing situation, and the implementation of new infection control measures throughout the hospital.
